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coercion became embedded in colonial practices over time. What unites 
them is their attempt to tease out the connections between colonialism and 
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Introduction
Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds
martin thomas
Mental Maps, Disorder, and Colonial Violence
It was political scientist Alan Henrikson who introduced us to the term 
“mental maps” as a determinant of social action.1 The idea that the at-
titudinal outlooks embedded in minds as a result of cultural formation 
and past experience are integral to political choices has gained purchase 
ever since. Among the specialist communities quickest to recognize the 
usefulness of the “mental maps” idea have been Henrikson’s fellow 
political scientists, international historians, and scholars of the “miss-
ing dimension” of intelligence service activity interested in processes of 
cognition — the way the world is understood — and resultant analyti-
cal thinking.2 Historians of empire and colonialism have, by contrast, 
tended to use the idea of mental maps piecemeal, sometimes to explain 
the diffusion of Orientalist thinking, sometimes to account for (usually 
misguided) policy decisions, but more often in a rather nebulous way to 
illustrate the misapprehensions of European publics about the colonial 
empires held in their name.
The first volume of this collection on French “colonial minds” sug-
gested that one issue uniting the various people and events described is 
that thought normally precedes action. But the actions of those in posi-
tions of colonial power in the French Empire were also, to a greater to 
lesser extent, reflective of established patterns of behavior. Furthermore, 
as the phrase implies, a pattern of behavior necessarily took shape over 
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time through repetition and reinforcement of certain actions.3 In the case 
of army or police organizations, such repetition and reinforcement could 
entrench certain patterns of behavior, sometimes disbarring consider-
ation of alternative perspectives that cut against the grain of prevailing 
military assumptions about subject populations and how they were to 
be regarded, policed, or otherwise “controlled.” The organizational cul-
tures of France’s colonial security forces, in other words, often acted as a 
barrier to reflective engagement with colonial peoples. As a result rarely 
were innovations, whether in operational practice or in military cultures, 
internally generated outside crisis conditions. Only after dramatic politi-
cal failures or violent outbreaks were attitudes likely to change, which is 
part of what Edgar Schein, a leading theorist of organizational culture, 
terms the process of “trauma learning.”4 But were colonial military 
minds susceptible to such learning in less overtly violent times?
Here we come to perhaps the most challenging and often the most 
revealing aspect of colonial minds at work: those situations in which, it 
seems, thought hardly preceded action at all. Indeed, in some instances 
historians posit that the behavior of Europeans in unfamiliar colonial 
settings was anything but rational. Numerous colonial encounters, from 
initial contact to protracted exposure, have been described in terms of 
irrationality, mental disorder, even madness, or, less dramatically, as 
the abandonment of European norms and manners, the dread outcome 
of which was “going native.”5 A distinct subdiscipline of “colonial” 
psychiatry, many of whose practitioners and critics achieved lasting no-
toriety, looked on the racial differentiation inherent to colonial societies 
as pivotal to new delineations of mental disorder and supposed African 
inferiority that helped entrench colonial power.6
The metaphor of psychiatric disorder will also be familiar to anyone 
acquainted with the work of Martiniquan psychiatrist and anticolonial 
revolutionary Frantz Fanon, as well as to scholars of decolonization 
more generally. As Ann Laura Stoler has recently reminded us, Fanon’s 
central concern with the lasting physical distress, the personal degra-
dations, and psychological disorders left among Algerians scarred by 
French colonial rule was very much a study in the ruination of minds.7 
And as Benjamin Brower and Marnia Lazreg have emphasized in the 
same context, any study of colonial “official thinking,” whether in the 
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first phases of imperial conquest or in the final years of colonial collapse, 
must engage with the cruelties and coercion perpetrated as part of the 
imperial claim to govern groups and communities judged subordinate 
and inferior.8
If Fanon’s primary purpose was to explain the injustices of colonial-
ism in terms of their corruptive effects on the minds of colonizers and 
colonized alike, his preoccupation with violence — whether that perpe-
trated in the name of the colonial state or that demanded of colonial 
subjects freeing their bodies and purifying their minds through acts of 
insurrection — suggests that the study of colonialism must encompass the 
study of violence. Such investigation must attempt at least two things. 
First, we need to define what is meant by violence. The chapters to fol-
low are dominated by physical acts of violence, most collective, some 
individual. But the authors recognize that violence could also be other-
wise. It might be cultural — the denigration of established ways of life or 
particular ethnicities or religions, for instance. It could be social — and 
here one thinks of the destruction of customary practices, communal 
bonds, and economic relationships. And it was sometimes psychologi-
cal — creating insecurity as a form of coercive practice. Violence, then, 
covers a wide spectrum from physical injury to societal disruption and 
the inculcation of fear.
Just as there were multifarious forms of violence, so, to paraphrase 
Benjamin Brower, colonial violence was informed by a “multiple logic.” 
Violent acts imposed new forms of social exclusion. Destruction or 
seizure of resources created new economic hierarchies. Both provided 
physical evidence of imperial “reach” far beyond established centers of 
colonial power. The use of force, on some occasions, reflected presump-
tions about the impossibility or pointlessness of political compromise. 
It mirrored official understanding about how colonized communities 
understood displays of power. And it revealed deeply racist precepts 
about the nature of permissible killing in “uncivilized” societies.9 Per-
haps more familiar in the conquest period, these tendencies resurfaced 
during France’s wars of decolonization during which anticolonial in-
surgents and their civilian backers were denied the rights accorded to 
enemy combatants.10 State repression, at its most extreme during the 
Algerian War, brings us to another unsettling problem: the muting effects 
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of violence on colonial minds — and voices. Colonial civil and military 
administrators imposed certain silences in respect of violent acts prac-
ticed for “reasons of state.”11 Their tendency to censor and censure was 
compounded by the efforts of their anticolonial opponents to expose 
the levels of violence practiced against them before the court of inter-
national opinion.12
Confronting the specificity of colonial coercion raises a second chal-
lenge: the need for a typology of violence to tease out its specifically 
“colonial” dimension. If this explains Fanon’s near obsessive concern 
with the subject, it also indicates why most studies of colonial vio-
lence tend to concentrate primarily on the perpetrators of violence and 
their particular relationship with identifiable centers of colonial power, 
whether these were governments, regional administrations, police and 
army commands, or major corporate employers.13 Putting French vio-
lence first takes us some way to identifying the colonial element in the 
subject, but it does not alone suffice. For the violent actions described 
above could be seen as simple variants of state violence practiced within 
acutely unequal societies and predicated on the control or conversion of 
a dominant social group. This does not mean, however, that we should 
reject the colonial state as a primary agent of colonial violence; far from 
it. Perhaps more than anything else, what makes the violence described 
in this volume different — and singularly colonial — is its duality. For 
colonial violence was both constitutive of colonial power and destruc-
tive of it. And these opposing processes often proceeded simultaneously. 
The contradiction here may be unraveled if we think in terms of con-
flicting short-term needs and longer-term goals. Violence as repression 
was typically applied to impose colonial order in the short term. But 
its prevalence undermined longer-term efforts to reconstruct colonized 
societies to suit the requirements of the colonizing power. Violence could 
silence opposition, but it was an insecure foundation on which to build 
a supposedly better society. The ways in which French colonial minds 
wrestled with this contradiction take us to the very essence of French 
imperialism.
Sometimes routine state violence or military repression provoked acts 
of spectacular counterviolence, which left entire army units wiped out. 
Catastrophic losses like the October 1950 “Cao Bang disaster” during 
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the Indochina War, which left 4,800 troops either dead or missing, or 
the Palestro “massacre” southeast of Algiers in May 1956 in which 
19 recently arrived rappelés and their section commander were fatally 
ambushed sent shock waves through metropolitan opinion. These trans-
gressions of the usual asymmetry between state repression versus antico-
lonial violence seared themselves into official memories of colonialism.14
Confronted with such dilemmas, perhaps not surprisingly the rulers 
of empire increasingly conceptualized its stresses in literal terms. Once 
social and political disorder in colonial territory was addressed in terms 
of a psychological crisis afflicting those who ran the show, could the end 
of colonial dominion be very far off? This was precisely what happened 
in France’s postwar colonial service when senior officials sought to di-
agnose and cure the alleged “malaise” among administrators trying to 
govern an empire they no longer entirely controlled or understood. On 
the other side of the colonial-anticolonial divide, Herman Lebovics has 
stressed how frequently the rulers of empire made use of psychological 
terms and diagnoses, albeit erroneously, to pathologize colonial rebel-
lion and anticolonial activity more generally as evidence of antisocial 
behavior rather than as a logical reaction to years of discrimination.15
As the chapters in this volume indicate, it is in the realm of colonial 
violence that the apparent disjuncture between rationality and actions, 
between sanity and psychiatric disturbance, between order and disor-
der, is most striking. If, as Caroline Ford has argued, the boundaries 
between religious violence and organized political protest in France 
became more porous during the nineteenth century, so, too, with the 
horrendous exception of repression of the Paris Commune in 1870, 
instances of collective violence in French society were less Rabelaisian, 
less highly ritualized, less self-consciously hellish than they had been 
in early modern France, most notably during the protracted religious 
warring of the sixteenth century. Violence had not gone away, but the 
codes of violent public behavior had changed.16 By the interwar period, 
political violence in metropolitan France, still recurrent and endemic, 
was nonetheless rationalized as either ideologically driven or part of the 
lingering, traumatic aftermath of the Great War.17 Colonial violence was 
represented differently in France at the time, not as politically organized 
and functional and bound by certain accepted limits, but as culturally 
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derived, dysfunctional, and potentially unlimited. What went generally 
unacknowledged was that such violence was often the result of colonial 
intervention or perpetrated by the French themselves.
The forms and scale of colonial violence, as well as the range of 
violent circumstances investigated here, confirm that French men and 
women both confronted and perpetrated violence in numerous ways. 
Some were products of rebellion, others the by-product of war. But what 
of less sensational occasions where the actions of Europeans appear, 
superficially at least, to have been unthinkingly violent? Was the casual 
violence meted out to a domestic servant, a plantation worker, or an 
intrusive street hawker carefully thought through, or was it merely a 
conditioned, almost reflex, response? Michael Vann’s chapter in this sec-
ond volume of the collection suggests, for instance, that French violence 
in colonial Hanoi was as casual as it was habitual. Were the stereotypical 
characterizations of indigenous traits the result of personal evaluation or 
merely the repetition of attitudes prevalent in the colonial milieu of the 
officers’ club, the settler’s home, or even the governor’s residence? How 
far was colonial stereotyping derivative of the prevalent French biomedi-
cal thinking and masculine honor codes to which Robert Nye’s work has 
alerted us? If, as seems likely, a readiness to use violence was essential to 
the socialization of young European men serving or working in colonial 
territories, then perhaps we may be able to discern distinctly colonial-
ist attitudes to violence itself.18 Bringing these viewpoints together, it is 
tempting to suggest that colonial violence reflected the predominantly 
masculine — and often highly macho — worlds of white colonial society, 
and that violence was also integral to the fabric of productive relations 
in colonial economies marked by labor-intensive industries, coercive 
practices, and, at least until 1936, official resistance to legal recognition 
of workers’ rights.19
Sociologies of Violence
Consideration of the parameters of colonial violence is made easier by 
engaging with the ideas of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Originally 
brought to prominence by his ethnographical research into Algeria’s 
Kabyle Berber and Arab communities in the latter stages of the Algerian 
War, Bourdieu had much to say about forms of violence.20 To appreciate 
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this, one needs to dwell a little on his ideas of “capital” and “symbolic 
violence.” Rejecting Marxist materialism and structuralism, Bourdieu 
conceptualized capital as the various currencies of power in any given 
social arena or field. Individuals and groups seek to accumulate such 
capital to enhance their social status and power. This capital could be 
material and economic — tangible assets and resources — but it could also 
be intangible: the cultural capital conferred by linguistic ability, special-
ist knowledge, and academic qualification; or the “symbolic capital” 
conferred by high office, career achievement, or public reputation. This 
search for prestige, for elevated social status, while not uniquely colonial, 
was clearly manifest among officials, traders, settlers, and missionaries 
whose capacity to dominate or influence others rested, in part, on their 
acquisition of such symbolic capital.21
Bourdieu’s theories are doubly relevant to us here because of his sug-
gestion that possession of such capital also enhanced the ability of so-
cial actors to undertake acts of “symbolic violence,” that is, to impose 
their own normative standards and social meanings on other sections 
of society. In other words, armed with their advantages in capital — be it 
material, cultural, or symbolic — dominant social actors could legitimate 
their own prevailing standards and expectations about individuals’ be-
havior and deference to colonial authority as the normal way of things, 
as the way the world should be. Herein lay the ultimate irony: for the 
very success of symbolic violence such as this derived from the fact that 
those inculcated to accept these normative standards as superior and 
unchallengeable rarely perceived such domination as an act of violence 
in itself.22
In this sense the art of successful domination is subterfuge. To take 
a couple of examples, each from colonial Vietnam: evolving statist 
conceptions of socioeconomic development, or mise en valeur in the 
Vietnamese territories, justified French control in terms of heightened 
productivity, increased national output, and, in consequence, the ame-
lioration of poverty.23 Yet the prevailing modes of colonial production, 
from plantation agriculture to rubber extraction and mining, remained 
labor intensive, highly exploitative, and always poorly paid. The entire 
modernization project had labor coercion and continued impoverish-
ment at its core.24 At the same time, French imposition of educational 
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curricula that systematically denigrated precolonial cultures while laud-
ing France’s historic achievements illustrated Bourdieu’s conception of 
symbolic violence in practice.25 If we can see forms of violence in the 
printed word of the schoolroom, then surely it was also present in the 
adult world of colonial workplaces and private lives. Put simply, how 
should we read such quotidian facets of colonial rule: the low-level but 
persistent colonial violence, the petty prejudice, or the ingrained racism 
of some colonial minds? Were they born of the colonial encounter, or 
were they products of attitudes and assumptions developed over time, 
sometimes in France itself? Was colonial violence part of European ef-
forts to sustain order, or did it reflect the breakdown of order whether 
at the national, local, or even familial level?
Again, other sociological approaches may help us here. Expanding on 
the work of Donald Black and Roberta Senechal de la Roche, the social 
theorist David Sciulli draws a conceptual distinction between consensual 
and nonconsensual types of “orderly behavior.” He suggests on the one 
hand that orderliness may reflect individuals’ capacity for social control, 
but on the other hand that orderly behavior may also be the outcome 
of social integration. As Sciulli explains it, “Individuals are controlled 
when it is not possible for them simply to recognize and understand 
in common what is expected of them; in their fear and anxiety, they 
are supine. By contrast, individuals’ orderliness may be a product of 
their possible social integration when the rules or duties orienting their 
behavior are at least kept recognizable and understandable.”26 Sciulli’s 
ideas are useful when considering violent interactions between colonial 
overseers and colonized subjects because they suggest that external im-
position of “orderly behavior” amounted to a form of social engineering 
built on the premise that the colonial subjects to be made “orderly” were 
incapable of integration into a colonial order that was alien to them. 
Colonial subjugation, in other words, stemmed from the institutionaliza-
tion of repressive social control within the bureaucratic and legal fabric 
of the colonial state. Whether or not colonial control stemmed directly 
from military conquest, it seems reasonable to suggest that violence was 
integral to the structures of colonialism: its economic foundations, its 
institutions, and its governing precepts.27
The full implications of this argument bear amplification. Just as the 
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organized use of violence might be constitutive of order, in this case the 
consolidation of the administrative apparatus of the colonial state, its 
demands and its practices, so resistance to it might be destructive of 
that order.28 To borrow sociological terminology, collective violence, 
or the coordinated inflicting of physical damage by a group, is not ab-
normal or “deviant”; rather it is a form of social control capable of 
coherent explanation. As the leading social theorist Charles Tilly has 
warned us, while it is rash to claim that such violence conforms to any 
generic laws or theories, discrete patterns of collective violence may 
be discerned nonetheless.29 We have, it seems, come a long way from 
Gustave Le Bon’s elaboration of “crowd theory” in the 1890s. Far from 
being symptomatic of mass hysteria or the derangement of a collective 
“crowd mind” as Le Bon suggested, group violence may be justified, 
either as a form of social protest in the absence of permitted nonviolent 
alternatives, or, on the opposing side of the political divide, as a means 
to suppress such protest.30 Its form and frequency is also conditioned 
by the “conflict structure” that pertains in the society in question; in 
other words it is substantially contingent on the extent of social division, 
economic iniquity, and perceived cultural difference between the parties 
involved.31 To use the language of political psychology, levels of political 
violence are likely to reflect patterns of socialization in a particular com-
munity as well as the form and extent of centralized state control over 
that community.32 To paraphrase Jeff Goodwin’s work on revolutionary 
movements after 1945, violent protest is typically pursued by groups 
that discern “no other way out” of their societal condition.33 If we take 
these indicators as our yardstick, endemic violence in colonial societies 
is unsurprising both because the socialization of dependent peoples as 
colonial subjects denied them basic rights and resources, and because, 
paradoxically, colonial state control was typically too weak or remote 
to enforce rigid popular compliance in all circumstances. Furthermore, 
the sense of embattlement among colonial elites nurtured threat percep-
tions about the local populations around them that became manifest 
in heightened levels of repression whenever the colonial state seemed 
especially vulnerable to dissent or overthrow.34
Yet, as Roberta Senechal de la Roche has argued convincingly — if 
provocatively — a double standard lurks in much of the sociological lit-
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erature on collective violence in sharply unequal societies. While the 
violence perpetrated by those suffering discrimination or oppression 
has been rationalized and in many cases defended or excused, that of 
the dominant groups in such societies is usually depicted as not only 
indefensible but irrational too.35 Adapted to our analytical context, the 
violence of the colonial oppressed is commonly depicted by academics 
as a normative response — maybe even a laudable one, but the counter-
violence it triggered from state authorities is typically seen as both unjust 
and abnormal. Looking back from a post-empire perspective, we are 
therefore confronted with an exact inversion of the way in which colo-
nial minds viewed the violence of colonizers and colonized. If Senechal 
de la Roche is right, then surely it is incumbent on us to exercise par-
ticular care when interpreting the violent actions of the rulers of empire 
and the outlooks and normative standards that lay behind them.
Rationalizing Colonial Violence
Such actions signified a reflection and a reinforcement of behaviors com-
monly observed in intercommunal colonial relations. This is not to reduce 
the Frenchmen and Frenchwomen of empire to mere “colonizer” stereo-
type. Not all resorted to violence. Not all denigrated indigenous society 
or, to use their own parlance, the indigènes they employed, they knew, or, 
in many cases, they lived alongside. Take, for instance, Albert Memmi, 
the Tunis-born novelist and teacher who first articulated the supposedly 
binary opposition between rulers and ruled in his 1957 book, The Colo-
nizer and the Colonized, and who conceded that those on each side of 
his equation were trapped there by circumstance, not choice.36 Memmi 
drew on his childhood experiences as a Jew in a predominantly Muslim 
colonial city and was writing just as Tunisia neared independence from 
France. He found himself trapped between the opposing categories he de-
scribed. He recognized, nonetheless, that colonizers sustained their privi-
leged position by accepting and sometimes working for a fundamentally 
racist political system, and a system upheld by coercing and excluding 
those that it identified as inferior. Colonialism, in other words, was inher-
ently violent, and its wrongs could only be rectified by destroying it.37
Memmi’s insight was to accept that there could be no halfway house 
on the road to decolonization. Yet others before him genuinely believed 
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in the progressive potential of colonialism and aspired to contribute to 
it. Individuals such as these sought to cultivate dependent populations 
rather than to expropriate from them, albeit on their own terms.38 In-
deed, some of the bitterest critics of colonial coercion and racial abuses 
emerged from settler communities or colonial careers. But one thing 
remains inescapable. The European populations spread across the French 
empire inhabited societies in which the differential treatment and the 
differential characterization of people were fundamental to the func-
tioning of the colony. And, whatever its roots in colonial conquest, in 
the political forms of the colonial state, in the economic structures of 
empire, such differentiation was deeply embedded in colonial minds. 
This was not a uniquely French phenomenon. Nor was it reducible to 
a single, generic racism derived from particular racial theories.39 Nor 
were discriminatory actions explicable simply as the product of a long-
standing foreign occupation. Yet, for all that, differential treatment of 
people according to their ethnicity, gender, or sexuality, whether actual 
or presumed, was prevalent among settlers, officials, and missionaries; 
in short, among Europeans in the colonies.
Institutionalized discrimination and the high incidence of low-level, 
banal violence across racial and communal divides cannot be reduced 
to a simplistic binary characterization of hegemonic colonial violence 
versus determined anticolonial popular resistance. For one thing, the 
colonial “presence” in many of the dependent territories colored blue, 
pink, or orange on the European classroom walls of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was far less entrenched and altogether 
more fleeting than imperialist publics “back home” were led to believe. 
In many places the “colonial state” hardly amounted to any kind of 
functioning administrative provision at all.40 For another, European colo-
nial bureaucrats such as those vying for influence across late nineteenth-
century tropical Africa typically justified the violence of conquest not as 
enforced subjugation but as transient pacification, as the displacement 
of the apparently endemic feuding between what veteran anthropologist 
Jack Goody describes as “acephalous ‘tribal’ groups” by the orderli-
ness of fixed state boundaries, new legal regimens, and white-officered 
constabularies.41 Perhaps most important of all, an accretion of rules, 
regulations, and customary practices made the use of violence routine. 
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What one historian has recently termed “the banality of brutality” was 
a sedimentary process in which arbitrary arrest, collective punishments, 
coercive interrogation techniques, and denial of basic rights of redress 
were all layers on which endemic security force violence was built. To 
those acculturated to practice it, such violence was not exceptional or 
inexcusable, but the logical outcome of past precedent — the way “to 
get things done.”42
Even the use of corporal punishment, whipping and caning in par-
ticular, to coerce African labor or mete out instant discipline to alleged 
wrongdoers was frequently excused by Europeans in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries as not only expedient but readily under-
stood by those who experienced or witnessed it. According to the de-
fenders of such practices, inflicting physical pain helped bring order both 
to colonial society and to naive, disorderly African minds. It was no 
coincidence that whereas flogging was banned in the British Army dur-
ing the 1870s, whipping and caning persisted within Britain’s colonial 
forces in Africa until 1946.43 The institutionalization of colonial violence 
through legal procedure and regimens of punishment was thus depicted 
as progressive and modern, part of the transition from precolonial dis-
order to colonial order. Progressive it may have been claimed to be, but 
colonial violence was also clearly systemic. It was in part bound up with 
the political obligations, social structures, and economic processes im-
posed by European rule, in part facilitated by European understandings 
of how order in dependent societies could and should be maintained.44 
Moreover, as international efforts to codify binding laws of war gathered 
momentum during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
imperial nations ensured that colonial rule was exempted from puta-
tive restrictions on the rights and actions of occupying powers.45 Not 
until the composition of the United Nations General Assembly was 
transformed by an influx of formerly colonized Afro-Asian states in 
the 1950s were levels of colonial violence finally exposed to sustained 
and hostile international scrutiny.46 Prior to this, as we shall see, just as 
violence was writ large in colonial experience, so it was integral to the 
attitudes and cultures of practice of numerous colonial authority figures.
A number of the chapters in this volume also show that the colonies 
were laboratories for organized violence, where new forms of suppres-
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sion, punishment, and political control were practiced and refined. Co-
lonial borrowing of metropolitan policing methods and the interplay 
between colonial and metropolitan ideas of urban planning and so-
cial regulation in cities indicate that experimentation in forms of social 
control was an interactive process between the empire and mainland 
France.47 Innovation in organized colonial violence, whether in terms 
of legal restrictions and punishments, policing dissent, or reconfiguring 
colonial cities to facilitate segregation and surveillance, was necessarily 
a continuous process, but it reached a new intensity in the years imme-
diately after World War I. There were several reasons for this. One was 
population movement. While the French never colonized their empire 
with Anglo-Saxon enthusiasm, economic pressure, the greater accessibil-
ity of colonial territory, and the expansion of colonial bureaucracy and 
commerce in the interwar years sent tens of thousands of new colonists 
to the empire. The new arrivals soon registered their presence in mate-
rial change such as the growth of settler-inhabited nouvelles villes in 
the cities of French North Africa and Vietnam, which gave concrete 
expression to the economic and cultural hierarchies of colonialism.48 
Also apparent after 1918 was a growing tension among politicians, 
legislators, and officials over the long-term direction of colonial policy 
in the aftermath of a conflict so shockingly destructive that it rendered 
formulaic rhetoric about the civilizing potential of European cultures 
outmoded and trite. Genuine antipathy to empire remained a minority 
interest, the preoccupation of Communist activists, colonial students 
resident in France, and surrealist artists determined to demythologize 
received wisdom about French imperial benevolence.49 Yet in the politi-
cal mainstream too, French colonial minds were adjusting to different 
currents of opinion about the long-term justifications for empire. Nu-
merous government members, senior officials, academics, writers, and 
other social commentators, none of them anticolonialists, recognized 
that France’s imperial purpose required some measure of reinvention, 
perhaps even more radical revaluation. This rethinking underpinned 
major colonial policy shifts informed by reconfigurations of race, ideas 
of colonial citizenship, and the essence of French identity.50
For others, empire remained an unimpeachable project, but one 
whose fixity could only be sustained with the new technologies of 
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coercive power more readily available after the Great War. It was no 
coincidence that imperial conflicts of the 1920s became at once the 
preferred sites of experimentation for new weapons of war — military 
aircraft, armored vehicles, poison gas — and the dumping ground for 
surplus military hardware left over from the years 1914–18. Colonial 
rebels, dissentient colonial communities, and even recalcitrant colonial 
taxpayers faced lethal violence delivered on an unprecedented scale by 
airplanes, tanks, and machine guns.51 This trend toward greater lethality 
in repressive violence was prefigured before 1914 in more widespread 
use by colonial security forces of weaponry considered unacceptable 
in intra-European conflict. The dumdum bullet, designed to maximize 
bodily trauma and blood loss, stands as a ghastly exemplar of this shift.52 
Using high-technology weapons (by the standards of the day) to assure 
even greater asymmetry in colonial violence (keeping white casualties 
down while killing as many opponents as possible) became still more 
prevalent as European militaries built on their experiences of the Great 
War. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the widespread turn to 
“air policing” as a cheap but deadly form of colonial control. In the 
expanded French and British colonial empires that took shape after 
World War I newly available apparatus of imperial coercion made the 
open skies — the very air — over the North African Maghreb and the 
Fertile Crescent of the Middle East a new type of political, military, and 
cultural space. Politically, mastery of the air emphasized the apparent 
superiority of Western industrial modernism, underscoring the right to 
rule of imperial nations. Militarily, the airplane offered new possibilities 
of force projection, destructive power, and consequent strategic advan-
tage. Politically, coercive bombardment transcended the temporal divide 
between initial imposition of colonial authority through the threat, or 
use, of indiscriminate violence and the subsequent maintenance of im-
perial power through more selective violence targeted against dissident 
populations, whether as an end in itself or as an instrument of broader 
deterrence.53
Other key post–World War I changes help us understand what made 
such repressive violence appear natural and unavoidable to its European 
practitioners. To adapt Zara Steiner’s comment about the peacemaking 
of 1919, none of the usual bases for state identity — language, religion, 
Buy the Book
Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds
xxv
ethnicity, geography, ideology — commanded universal assent as a basis 
either for individual colonial statehood or for common identity across 
the French Empire as a whole.54 Concepts of what it was to be truly, 
authentically French, whether citizen or worker, and not some ersatz, 
colonial alternative were also fast becoming more ethnically and cultur-
ally exclusive.55 The year 1919 marked a moment of huge significance 
in the crystallization of racist attitudes in France for another reason: 
the mass expulsion of factory workers, as well as other unskilled and 
semiskilled laborers, recruited from the colonies to assist the war effort 
in metropolitan France.56 As Tyler Stovall notes, “The vaunted exoti-
cism and fascination with empire of the interwar years arose not just 
from the colonial presence in wartime France, but also from its abrupt 
termination once the war was over. . . . In sending imperial subjects 
back home, the French inadvertently gave racial distinctions a new, and 
permanent, place in the metropole itself.” In Stovall’s pithy summary, 
“the very nature of Frenchness was conditioned by race.” The inescap-
able conclusion is that one of the most critical factors in making early 
twentieth-century minds “colonial” was a sense of “whiteness” that 
became synonymous with a more exclusive, ethnocentric idea of French 
national identity in the 1920s and beyond.57
It is also worth remembering, however, that French colonial minds did 
not solely define the limits of social inclusion and exclusion in terms of 
whiteness. Officials and settlers were often suspicious of colonial fellow 
travelers, individuals who may have been employed by the colonial state 
or French commercial enterprises, but who remained either ideologically 
hostile to, or profoundly disillusioned with, the imperial project. The 
colonies, after all, were sometimes a refuge for the escapee, the outsider, 
or the felon, let alone the adventurer or the dissident. From 1895 on-
ward in French West Africa, for example, police surveillance of white 
Europeans was sometimes as rigorous as that of African colonial sub-
jects. Indeed, transgression of acceptable norms of European behavior, 
whether culturally or politically, carried with it the threat of expulsion, 
incarceration, or even, in extreme cases, more violent criminal punish-
ment.58 Nor were settler communities homogeneous. Ethnic tensions, 
particularly among the various Latin communities of French North 
Africa, were by the 1920s intensifying amid the ideological frictions 
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spilling over from southern Europe. Here, too, suspicion, stereotyping, 
even sedition, infected European colonial minds.59
The accumulated experiences of the 1930s Depression, the upheavals 
of defeat, regime changes, and “liberation” in World War II, and the pro-
liferation of anticolonial violence as pressure for national independence 
gathered momentum after 1945 inevitably swayed colonialist outlooks. 
But neither local disorder nor extraneous factors proved sufficient to 
decolonize colonial minds to the extent that peaceful transitions from 
empire to nation-state became possible in French Africa or Southeast 
Asia.60 Rather, the violence of colonialism entered its last and bloodiest 
phase. In a quantum leap from the protests and containable rebellions of 
the pre-1939 period, wars of decolonization and unprecedented violence 
gripped Indochina, Madagascar, and French North Africa. Cumulatively, 
these conflicts spanned generations. Their immediate origins were evi-
dent in the disputed colonial heritage of World War II, in arguments over 
precisely who or what would resume the levers of power throughout 
the empire and with what longer-term objectives. Their final acts were 
part of the supposedly postcolonial international order of the 1960s. 
In many cases, sites of colonial violence would morph into sites of in-
ternationalized conflict as Cold War pressures, regional rivalries, and 
contested political successions provoked renewed struggles for power 
in which the French found themselves largely observers.61
Violence, then, was as intrinsic to imperial decline as it was to impe-
rial expansion. But was it merely the unprecedented breadth and scale 
of decolonization’s violence that marked it out as different from its 
prewar antecedents? Or are the patterns of collective violence in French 
colonies after 1945 much the same as before? At the geopolitical level, 
new elements might be sought in the intrusion of Cold War rivalry and 
the growing part played by foreign proxies that arose from it.62 The con-
solidation of stronger organized nationalist groups and the fundamental 
changes promised by Fourth Republic reformism each altered the terrain 
on which contested colonial politics were fought. Deeper socioeconomic 
changes also made empire something of a powder keg in the postwar 
world. Industrial concentration and attendant labor disputes, urbaniza-
tion and heightened demographic pressure, plus the reconfiguration of 
trade between the colonial world, France, and the capitalist West: all 
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presented harder challenges to colonial authorities.63 Rapidly changing 
cultural expectations in the colonies and in France about permissible 
interventionism and permissible levels of violence — about what colo-
nial administrations could or should be doing — added to the weight 
on official minds.64 Also striking after 1945 were the growing regional 
imbalances within French colonial violence, between what became war 
zones — in Southeast Asia, Madagascar, and North Africa — and wide 
swathes of territory, principally in West and Equatorial Africa and the 
island territories, where organized political violence remained rare. The 
settler presence, proximity to Cold War front lines, the amount of French 
capital — human and commercial — at stake: each played a role in such 
variation. But none is sufficient to explain it outright. In those regions 
where colonial impasse prevailed, oppositional violence and counter-
violence gained intensity meanwhile. The result was to warp colonial-
ist attitudes into grotesque self-parody. For some, most infamously in 
the upper reaches of the colonial military, erstwhile imperial ideals of 
sacrifice, public service, and cultural transmission became twisted into 
a last-ditch defense of the colonial presence, seemingly at any price. Ex-
ploring diehard colonial minds in the age of decolonization resolves itself 
into a disturbing exploration of how political circumstances, cultural 
misreading, authoritarian impulses, and closed organizational cultures 
give rise to extreme violence.65
Chapter Content: Volume 2
The first of this volume’s two sections is focused on “cultures of violence 
in the French Empire.” The Algerian colonial experience is writ large 
here, as it is throughout the volume, and it is to France’s premier African 
colony that we turn in William Gallois’s essay, the first of the six essays 
in this section. His is a careful reconsideration of changing depictions of 
the French Army’s bloody work of Algerian conquest from the 1830s to 
the 1850s. Creeping southward colonization, first into the fertile lands 
beyond the coast, then toward the Sahara’s northern reaches, was never 
the “peaceful penetration” initially promised by its advocates. Punitive 
raids or razzias, collective punishments, even the slaughter of entire 
town populations and quiet toleration of slavery, all would mark out 
the Algerian conquest for decades ahead.66 Gallois suggests that this 
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process, through which mass violence entered the normative practice 
of Algerian colonial rule, gave rise to multiple French “mental maps,” 
each with distinctive perspectives on whether and how the conquest 
should proceed. Far from being united and supportive, French political 
opinion emerges as diffuse and dissentient in Gallois’s account. Thus, the 
policy of settler colonization adopted in the late 1830s stirred powerful, 
Enlightenment-inspired intellectual opposition, which drew on the anti-
imperialism of writers such as Montesquieu. Division was also apparent 
between French liberals, who were quick to identify the colonial army 
with the suppression of domestic liberal dissent, and a broader popular 
culture, exemplified by pamphlets, pictures, cartoons, and songs, which 
venerated the Armée d’Afrique as a colonial reincarnation of Napoleon’s 
grand armée.
Gallois then turns to consideration of this army, its leadership, and its 
recourse to increasingly brutal forms of violence and collective punish-
ment. Forever identified with General Thomas Bugeaud, the infamous 
methods used to terrorize Algeria’s population hinged on the razzia — the 
destructive raid in which civilians were terrorized, their property burned, 
their livestock killed, and their crops seized or destroyed. Devised as a 
form of deterrence, this strategy also deliberately blurred the line be-
tween civilian and combatant, the noncommittal and the insurgent.67 
Sexual violence was also part of the repertoire of French terror, hold-
ing a mirror to the darkest reaches of colonial minds as military com-
manders essentialized the Algerian population as an undifferentiated 
enemy against which violent acts of whatever sort were justified as, at 
once, instrumental in hastening subjugation and outside the realms of 
warfare between “civilized” cultures. The brutality of the conquest also 
became inscribed on the minds of its perpetrators in other ways. Gallois 
describes how officers’ writings and reflections on their participation 
in massacre returned time and again to metaphors of madness and of 
a dystopian universe made real in Algeria. Thus, the leading colonial 
minds of the Armée d’Afrique increasingly cast themselves as victims, 
not instigators, of the violence and societal breakdown they described.
Metaphorical madness is meshed with actual evidence of mental dis-
order in Bertrand Taithe’s searing analysis of the Voulet-Chanoine Affair, 
one of the ghastliest and bloodiest episodes of colonial conquest run 
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riot in black Africa. The “affair” achieved notoriety in 1890s France, 
not because of the horrendous levels of violence perpetrated against the 
affected population of Upper Nigeria by a roving French military col-
umn, but because two of the junior officers in charge of this expedition 
murdered their French commanding officer before wreaking still more 
widespread havoc. Taithe shows that much may be learned about French 
colonial minds from the three themes that dominated French popular 
representation and political discussion of the Voulet-Chanoine Affair.
First, as mentioned above, a military expedition gone disastrously 
wrong only became a political scandal because of the murder of one 
officer by two others who were apparently driven to insanity by their 
personal encounters with colonialism. Linked to this, the second theme 
was a propensity to employ psychological and psychiatric explanations 
to explain the course of events. This Taithe identifies as a tendency to 
pathologize the French colonial mind, something that, as we have seen, 
would recur until the closing events of decolonization. Behind this lay 
a deeper assumption: namely, that the unfamiliarity of African colonial 
environs had an inherent capacity to derange European minds.68 The 
third theme was also perhaps the most telling. For all its savagery and 
casual violence, the story of the Voulet-Chanoine column’s gory prog-
ress across the African interior still lies within the spectrum of colonial 
conquest violence, albeit at the extreme end of that spectrum. In other 
words, this descent into the heart of darkness was not all that excep-
tional, its Conradian horror notwithstanding. Only the murder of a 
French officer by others made it so. Taithe’s vivid and shocking account 
of the Voulet-Chanoine expedition reminds us that colonial conquest 
could be the very antithesis of the selfless heroism in the face of horrific 
local violence portrayed in the popular press of the day.
Routine violence, admittedly of less severity, also lies at the heart of 
Michael Vann’s discussion of daily life in the settler districts of colonial 
Hanoi. As Vann describes it, French settlement in Hanoi was born in 
violence, nurtured in violence, and died in violence. Even where actual 
assaults did not occur, the threat of native attacks was omnipresent in 
Europeans’ lives.69 This is what Milton Osborne called the “background 
anxiety” of settler existence.70 Vann concedes, however, that the pau-
city of available statistics impedes precise sociological analysis of the 
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quality and quantity of European brutality, making any assessment of 
the random and daily acts of violence impressionistic. The picture that 
emerges is of corporal punishment as utterly routine, alongside racial 
intolerance and arbitrary violence against a Vietnamese workforce. None 
of this had much legal repercussion, at least for its perpetrators, but all 
of it served to reaffirm colonial domination.71 Yet, as Vann makes clear, 
in French colonial minds Hanoi was supposed to be different. The city 
was often held up to contemporaries as a “model” colonial capital, 
whose boulevards, beaux arts culture, and refined European taste sup-
posedly made it an island of tranquility amid a sea of rural hardship, 
piracy, and feuding warlords. The demographic reality belies this im-
age: Hanoi remained at least 90 percent indigène, and urban violence 
within its supposedly tranquil confines was a daily occurrence. The city 
also contained numerous sites of notorious violent acts whose symbolic 
importance resonated — albeit in contrasting ways — in the minds of the 
French, Vietnamese, and Chinese communities. The locations of a spate 
of café bombings in 1913 or of the attempted poisoning of the city 
garrison retained their poignancy for Europeans for years to come. So, 
too, for the Vietnamese did the public execution grounds in which large 
numbers of the country’s early nationalists met their end. The colonial 
Hanoi that Vann describes was one in which French and Vietnamese 
colonial minds would always remain completely at odds.
Joshua Cole’s expert treatment of the intercommunal violence that 
erupted in the Algerian city of Constantine in August 1934 also links 
issues of colonial mind-set with those of urban space. He suggests that 
“colonial spaces” should be seen as, in some ways, “exceptional spaces” 
in which violence played a central part.72 The point is proven by Cole’s 
investigation of the findings of the Algerian government’s commission 
of inquiry into Constantine’s 1934 riots. The commission took 126 
depositions and reports in the four months to October 1934 in its at-
tempt to attribute responsibility for the killing of twenty-four Jews and 
four Muslims during the two days of disorder. Far from illuminating 
the deeper causes of this intercommunal friction, the resultant official 
report rehearsed a number of stereotypes and clichés regarding Jewish 
and Muslim character traits and the role of Jews in the local economy, in 
local politics, and in local culture. This inquest — a devastating example 
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of an official colonial mind at work — articulated a vision of urban space 
in which indigènes, Israélites, and settlers only emerged insofar as they 
conformed to the bureaucratic characterization of a city demarcated 
into separate quartiers, within which particular communities could be 
expected to behave in certain ways. In this reading of events, the Jews 
of Constantine were an essentially tribal community within the city and 
thus, perversely, were responsible for their own persecution.
Cole’s argument goes further. He also reinterprets the anti-Semitic 
violence of August 1934 and, in particular, the prominent role of local 
Algerian Muslims within it, in light of the complex identity politics of 
interwar Algeria in which categories of citizen and subject were more 
highly politicized than ever. Much as local Jews strove to capitalize 
on their status as citizens of the republic, Muslim community leaders 
wrestled with the contradictions of constitutional and legal provisions 
that enfranchised a narrow Muslim elite while still excluding the major-
ity of their co-religionists. Cole’s conclusion tells us a good deal about 
the sometimes dreadful consequences of how colonial minds worked. 
His chapter illuminates the devastating consequences of the ways in 
which the French authorities enshrined ethno-religious difference in 
differential legal rights and limited access to the privileges of citizen-
ship. Appreciating the resentments fired by each of these discriminatory 
practices is critical in understanding what, superficially at least, has 
usually been interpreted as an explosion of endemic intercommunal 
violence — something emotive and visceral rather than highly politicized. 
Far from it: Constantine’s deadly riots in August 1934 demonstrated that 
colonial constructions of difference — in housing, in law, in citizenship 
rights — complicated supposedly binary oppositions between European, 
Jewish, and Muslim populations, making the frictions between them 
less ethnically or religiously derived and more the product of Algeria’s 
stumbling progress toward mass politics.
Samuel Kalman’s chapter retains the focus on interwar Algeria but 
investigates a different community of colonial minds, those of the pieds-
noirs settlers of the immediate prewar years, most notably in Oran, the 
most settler-dominated city in the colony. In his reassessment of colon 
support for the French ultrarightist movement, the Croix de Feu and its 
post-1937 incarnation as the Parti Social Français (psf), Kalman uncov-
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ers the specifically colonial factors that underpinned European support 
for this quasi-fascistic group. His chapter dissects the public discourse 
of local psf leaders, their violently anti-Semitic rhetoric in particular, 
and contextualizes this language of violence by revisiting some of the 
ultrarightists’ most notorious practices. In doing so his essay places the 
exploitative nature of Algerian intercommunal relations, the de facto 
segregation in the urban space of Algeria’s major cities, as well as rising 
settler fears of Algerian integral nationalism at the heart of the Croix 
de Feu/psf appeal.
As Kalman demonstrates both here and elsewhere, the language of 
hatred and the political violence it posited were instrumental in ex-
treme rightist action and integral to the collective identity of ultraright-
ist supporters, especially within the settler quartiers of Algeria’s major 
towns. For all their odious invective the ultrarightists in France were 
significantly less violent than their counterparts in Algeria.73 For, as 
Kalman argues, the glorification of violence in the febrile atmosphere of 
interwar Algeria was also symptomatic of something more, something 
attributable to distinctly colonial minds. Echoes of the demographic 
insecurity that nurtured the virulent racism apparent in Algeria’s set-
tler culture during the interwar years were, for instance, to be found in 
the continuing appeal of triumphalist Algerianist writings, typified by 
the work of Robert Randau, as well as in the persistent use of crude 
racial stereotypes in the settler press.74 Kalman picks up these cultural 
undercurrents and concludes that an underlying anxiety pervaded the 
minds of those settlers drawn to the ultraright. Despite the virulence of 
their language and the violence of their activities, a sense of vulnerability 
about the irresistible force of Algerian Muslim nationalism character-
ized their outlook. Put simply, behind the extreme right’s discourse of 
colonial domination — racial and political — lay an abiding fear in the 
settler mind, that of being swamped by the Muslim majority.
A different form of violence in Algeria, this time French-directed, 
is central to my essay, the last in this first section. It revisits the colos-
sal state retribution meted out in the immediate aftermath of the May 
1945 rebellion in the Constantine region of eastern Algeria.75 Official 
blindness to the fatal weakness of the colonial state, part rhetoric, part 
self-deception, is fundamental to an understanding of what followed the 
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initial revolts in and around the towns of Sétif and Guelma. The colonial 
authorities’ refusal to admit either the extent of Algerian loathing for 
them or the possibility of their overthrow by revolution from below tells 
us much about the “colonial minds” that directed the officially sanc-
tioned killings over the summer of 1945. The state violence occasioned 
by the uprising represented far more than a simple restoration of colonial 
order. Echoing William Gallois’s chapter on the early colonial period, 
I argue that colonial rule created the socioeconomic circumstances in 
which an essentialized view of undifferentiated indigènes, or Muslim 
Algerians, as inferior, savage, and inherently prone to violence became 
intrinsic to the actions of security forces and settler vigilantes.
As evidence accumulated of the savagery of the killings and sexual 
violence in Sétif, Guelma, and, especially, the smaller settlement of Péri-
gotville, so the tendency among an enraged settler community to ascribe 
collective guilt, to impugn the entire Muslim population as inherently 
vicious, increased.76 There are parallels here with the ways in which 
European colonial populations in other empires chose to read other 
episodes of collective violence, and, again, Ann Stoler’s work is particu-
larly useful. In her analysis of Dutch responses to 1920s outbreaks of 
worker unrest in Java’s plantation belt Stoler discerns a distinct interpre-
tive pattern to colonial readings of dissent: “Here it is not violence per 
se that justified armed police, intelligence networks, a penal code, and 
physical force, but violence of a particular sort, stripped of its validity 
and exposed as the response of irrational and rapacious elements. It 
had to be shown as something outside rationality: as an unreasonable 
response according to the canons of Western thought.”77 Security force 
analyses of the Algerian situation depicted violent indigenous protest 
in the same way. Intelligence assessment disconnected the practice of 
violence by colonial subjects from socioeconomic conditions or political 
grievances, denying its perpetrators any voice by insisting that the killing 
of Europeans marked an atavistic return to the savagery inherent to Al-
gerian identity.78 As James McDougall notes, this insistence on inherent 
Algerian savagery was integral to French colonial thinking and made 
recourse to violence against colonial subjects seem logically imperative.79
In its scale, its severity, and its target selection the French repression 
let loose on eastern Algeria from May to August 1945 combined all that 
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was worst about colonialism — intercommunal mistrust, socioeconomic 
discrimination, cultural supremacy, and security force banality toward 
acts of extreme violence perpetrated against a subject population.80 My 
essay suggests that this consensus about the need for overwhelming 
retributive violence ignored the tangible socioeconomic crisis that was 
integral to the original outbreaks. By obscuring the very real material 
hardships occasioned by food shortages and a breakdown in eastern Al-
geria’s foodstuff distribution networks in the latter stages of World War 
II, the colonial authorities achieved two objectives. First, they absolved 
themselves of blame for Algerian radicalization. Second, they negated 
rational explanations for popular participation in attacks on European 
settlers. As I contend, the Sétif uprising demonstrated the capacity of 
political parties, religious groups, and Muslim cultural associations to 
harness popular anger over long-standing economic hardship and cul-
tural marginalization to nationalist political ends, something that the 
colonial minds of French officialdom in Algiers and Paris were reluc-
tant to concede. Little wonder, then, that after Sétif there was no going 
back, that colonial and nationalist minds were closed to the possibility 
of compromise.
Volume 2’s second section, “Colonial Minds and Empire Soldiers,” 
also comprises six chapters. Collectively, they focus squarely on ques-
tions of attitude, perception, and stereotyping in the characterization 
and treatment of distinct strata of colonial society, including French 
colonial troops, Muslim populations, and African women in mixed-
race relationships. The prevalence of eugenicist ideas about what was 
socially, racially, and sexually acceptable and what, in turn, was mor-
ally reprehensible is evident within several of the colonial minds ana-
lyzed here. So, too, was an awareness that while “acceptability” was 
relative, its boundaries determined by local circumstance, colonists and 
officials nonetheless defined their normative standards against certain 
benchmarks of public behavior that required the preservation of French 
dignity and prestige at all costs.81 Predominantly, these were men of 
influence bound up in the codes of masculinity that Robert Nye has 
identified as integral to the ethics of French professional elites during 
the Belle Epoque and afterward.82 Nowhere more so than in the arena of 
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interracial sex, a subject whose symbolic importance, whether in terms 
of punitive regulation, boundaries transgressed, or bitter proof of mas-
culine colonial power, makes it central to any consideration of colonial 
minds.83 Contrary to what we — with twenty-first-century minds — might 
consider the worst sexual transgressions, “scandalous” behavior among 
serving imperial officials signified actions that undermined French co-
lonial standing rather more than activities that might, in hindsight, be 
considered cruel, criminal, or morally reprehensible.84 Owen White’s 
chapter touches on all of this section’s central themes: colonial minds, 
bodies, and power relationships. His chapter makes extensive use of 
diaries and private letters to shed new light on four interracial relation-
ships that took place in different parts of French West Africa during the 
1890s and 1900s. The sensitivity of his account challenges us to rethink 
ideas of colonial iniquity and sexual exploitation by confronting decep-
tively difficult questions. Were loving relationships between French men 
and African women either possible or sustainable in a colonial context? 
Were such unions inherently exploitative? If we know something of the 
answers in relation to African women, albeit inevitably too little, we 
know less about the Frenchmen involved, whose intimate thoughts have 
tended to become lost in sensationalist or recriminatory depictions of 
interracial colonial sex.85
White’s examination is of the most personal aspect of the colonial 
mind, perhaps the most impervious to dispassionate analysis. As he 
suggests, it is easy to find reference to such relationships, many of them 
depicted in exoticized, Orientalist language. It remains much harder to 
establish what such unions meant, especially to the two people involved. 
At one extreme there were undoubtedly numerous cases of clear sexual 
exploitation, often implicating those in high authority. To take but one 
example, Governor-General of French West Africa François Clozel, 
while on tour in northern Côte d’Ivoire, ordered daily “requisitions” 
of African women for him and his retinue, something that disgusted 
anthropologist Maurice Delafosse and others who witnessed it. Martin 
Klein has also demonstrated that the French Sudan of the 1890s was 
a colony run by and for the French Army, and a place where local 
women were often treated as part of the spoils of conquest, as de facto 
sex slaves.86 Here the violent and exploitative nature of interracial sex 
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conformed closely to the stereotypical, two-dimensional characteriza-
tion of white men using powerless black women. Moreover it is appar-
ent that any interracial relationship typically involved the removal of 
indigenous women or girls from their familiar spaces and local cultural 
environments to European ones. These new locations and spaces be-
came charged with colonial meaning as a consequence. Nonetheless, 
in uncovering the more intimate reaches of the French colonial mind, 
White’s essay points the way to a subtler, more multifaceted approach 
to interracial relationships, and so to the most intimate dimensions of 
colonial thinking, in the early years of French dominion in West Africa.
J. Kim Munholland’s essay revisits a well-known colonial military 
career, that of Ernest Psichari. Often depicted in heroic terms, Psichari, 
in the twenty years before he died on the Western Front, followed a dis-
tinct, but not unusual, political trajectory. It began with his upbringing 
in a secular, republican, liberal family and ended in espousal of ardent 
nationalism and high Catholicism. The path that connected these two 
contrasting outlooks was his protracted colonial military service. Even 
as a republican Dreyfusard, Psichari was ardently nationalist, but from 
a colonial viewpoint he increasingly perceived metropolitan bourgeois 
society as decadent and spiritually empty. Munholland shows that Psi-
chari was increasingly driven by fear of the power of radical Islam to 
overturn French imperial achievements. His vision grew more mille-
narian and racially exclusive as a result. Psichari’s remedy to what he 
articulated as an impending “clash of civilizations” was a more vigorous, 
Catholic-tinged pursuit of the civilizing mission. As Munholland makes 
plain, the development of Psichari’s colonial mind suggests that we need 
to rethink the categories of republican, nationalist, imperialist, Left, and 
Right, rejecting any simplistic antagonism between them.
Joe Lunn’s consideration of colonial minds and African military bod-
ies focuses upon the enormous numbers of young West African men 
conscripted into the French Army to help fight the Great War. At one 
level the massive recourse to African military manpower was rooted in 
fears of France’s worsening demographic disparity next to Germany. 
At another level the placement of armed colonial units in the front line 
was a logical next step for French military thinkers long accustomed, 
like their British counterparts, to the exploitation of African labor for 
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porterage and colonial campaigning.87 But as Lunn illustrates, only by 
considering the assumptions of those army officers in charge of the 
process can one appreciate the form that this conscription eventually 
took.88 As Richard Fogarty, another outstanding scholar of colonial 
soldiery in World War I, points out, the enforced recruitment of empire 
troops offers the starkest evidence of the contradictions inherent in a 
“republican imperialism” that sought to reconcile universalist ideas with 
the entrenched racial hierarchies of colonialism. By identifying whiteness 
with authority, maturity, and competence, the French military necessarily 
invested nonwhiteness with the opposite traits: indiscipline, immaturity, 
and lesser intellectual capacity.89 The one quality supposedly left to the 
empire’s “martial races” was their unquestioned capacity to fight. It 
was from this first principle that the concept of a force noire arose. 
The idea was initially propounded by a small coterie of career officers 
in the Sudanese units of the colonial army. They drew upon their own 
observations of West Africa’s “warrior races” and their reading of the 
hierarchies that they claimed to exist between them.90 Ardent proponents 
of the prevailing martial race theories of the day, these officers insisted 
that West Africans would make redoubtable infantry and outstanding 
assault troops.91 Crude racism also underpinned their arguments: cer-
tain Africans were allegedly attuned to particular military tasks because 
they were accustomed to being beasts of burden, to endurance. Others 
were supposedly equipped with “lesser” nervous systems, making them 
more tolerant of pain and suffering. And according to General Charles 
Mangin, the foremost architect of the force noire scheme, West African 
soldiery had no conception of scientific progress, a contention repeat-
edly used to justify differential treatment of colonial troops in Europe. 
Tracing the development of the force noire from initial conception to 
ultimate deployment, Lunn demonstrates that for many of the 140,000 
soldiers involved, the working of the French colonial military mind had 
devastating consequences.
Where Joe Lunn’s essay indicts French military officials for their atti-
tudes and behavior prior to and during World War I, Martin Alexander’s 
contribution does much the same by focusing on the fate of West African 
troops in the Battle of France during May–June 1940. Alexander notes 
the relative lack of interest, whether official, historical, or popular, in the 
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actions of colonial troops during this brief but bloody campaign next to 
their participation in the protracted trench warfare of 1914–18. With 
the notable exceptions of historians Myron Echenberg, Nancy Lawler, 
and, more recently, Raffael Scheck, African losses in the summer of 
1940 remain little studied.92 Yet, as Gregory Mann has suggested, the 
tirailleurs’ contribution to the defense of France in both world wars did 
more than anything else to change the ways in which colonial obligation, 
whether that of rulers to ruled, or of subjects to the mother country, was 
articulated in twentieth-century France. Indeed, the discourse of colo-
nial sacrifice and reciprocal duties still inflects contemporary thinking 
about the rights of France’s African immigrant communities today.93 This 
marks something of an advance on the racist caricatures so convincingly 
exposed by William Cohen’s work on French attitudes to black Africans 
before the twentieth century, and demonstrates once more the formative 
influence of wartime experience on French attitudes, both public and 
private.94 Martin Alexander’s essay builds on this, discerning a peculiarly 
colonial mixture of officer paternalism and abiding infantilization of 
African soldiers, with clear echoes of the characterization of colonial 
troops evident in World War I.95 Alexander examines the recruitment, 
training, and eventual deployment of colonial army divisions in the 
Battle of France, all factors immensely revealing of the persistent tropes 
that marked out French military thinking about the utility and purpose 
of colonial soldiers. Alexander shows how little military minds had 
altered in the twenty years from 1919 to 1939. By focusing on particu-
lar units through a series of four detailed — and heart-rending — battle 
case studies in which colonial infantry found themselves pitched into 
the battle for France from first encounters to final surrender, Alexander 
shows that senior military commanders remained in thrall to stereotypes 
familiar from the earlier Franco-German conflict. Colonial units were, 
once more, expected to play an assault role to which they were quite 
unsuited in the face of markedly superior German equipment. In de-
scribing the inevitable, tragic outcome, Alexander brings us face to face 
with the consequences of false assumptions in the French military mind.
The final two essays in this volume investigate lesser-known elements 
of the violence of Algeria’s decolonization. Their perspectives on colonial 
minds are unusual. The historical and present-day focus on extreme acts 
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of violence perpetrated on colonial or occupied populations perhaps ob-
scures the more pervasive, indeed omnipresent experience of psychologi-
cal terror and routine acts of lesser violence against civilian populations 
that were a more or less daily occurrence. Such was certainly the case in 
late colonial Algeria, the focal point of Neil MacMaster’s essay. His is a 
study both of colonial and anticolonial minds as well as of the victims 
of the uncompromising thinking among the strategists of the Algerian 
War. MacMaster argues convincingly that the quotidian terror meted out 
by both sides was just as central to colonial rule — and to revolutionary 
movements’ efforts to overthrow it — as the more spectacular killings of 
which more is now being written.96
The most salient — and damning — point here is that both sides, the 
colonial state and its anticolonial opponents, were utterly intolerant of 
attentisme, of civilians who sought, quite understandably, to straddle 
the political fence. Neither side forgave the noncommittal, making it 
impossible for civilians to shield themselves from the conflict by avoiding 
taking sides.97 This intolerance developed into a full-blown strategy of 
compliance terrorism.98 It was particularly effective as practiced through 
the Front de Libération Nationale’s collection of prohibitions — bans on 
smoking, drinking, fraternization, as well as its ruthless punishment of 
any cooperation with the colonial state. Focusing on the fln’s smoking 
ban and efforts made by French military and civil authorities to counter-
mand it, MacMaster provides a revealing point of entry into the social 
reality of the Algerian War and the mind-sets of those who fought it. 
His conclusion is clear: we should read the Algerian conflict as more of 
a civil war than is widely assumed.
Mathilde von Bülow surveys another facet of the Algerian War in the 
final essay in this closing section. Her chapter examines a particular facet 
of the internationalization of the conflict by discussing French police and 
intelligence service monitoring of fln activists and Algerian immigrant 
workers in Paris, northeastern France, and West Germany from 1957 to 
1962. In its account of arbitrary arrests, expulsions, detentions without 
trial, and even summary killings, von Bülow’s essay describes the work-
ing of security service minds driven toward increasingly extreme acts 
of violence. The catalyst here was the reorganization and relocation to 
Cologne in West Germany of the fln’s former covert network in main-
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land France.99 Using an array of recently declassified French and West 
German state documents, the essay traces the blurring of distinctions 
between terror and counterterror as the fight against the fln’s covert 
apparatus in Western Europe became more desperate. It also reveals 
how the violence perpetrated by the French security services escalated 
beyond the control of politicians, civilian officials, and diplomats. It is 
a frightening insight into the workings of security service minds as they 
struggled to counteract the growing successes of the fln as a revolution-
ary organization committed to the overthrow of French colonial rule.
Robert Aldrich surveys the issues raised across the two volumes in a 
reflective conclusion, a chapter in its own right, which discusses how we 
might usefully understand concepts of a “colonial mind.” He examines 
the long-term shifts in historical approaches to France’s troubling colo-
nial past, reminding us in doing so that any academic analysis of colonial 
minds must acknowledge factors liable to shape the interpretations of 
those doing the analyzing. Aldrich therefore evaluates the development 
of a French “national memory” of empire, relating this to changing 
historical readings of French colonialism. He discusses the phenomenon 
of “postcolonial forgetting” or the “occultation” of colonial misdoings. 
Evidence of such forgetting extended beyond France to many of its for-
mer colonial territories where a number of single-party states, themselves 
rooted in erstwhile anticolonial nationalist movements, have been pro-
scriptive and highly selective in their representation of the colonial past.
Matters began to change in the 1980s as interest in problems of 
collective memory grew dramatically, not least in French scholarship 
where Annalist and structuralist, often Marxist, approaches to history 
had, by then, lost their avant garde luster. Yet the colonies remained 
strangely absent from this process, initially at least.100 As Aldrich sug-
gests, something akin to a “thirty-year rule” seemed to apply to the 
study of colonial memory. A certain inverse equation was also at work 
here: space only opened up for the empire to command public atten-
tion as debates over Nazi occupation and Vichy collaboration slowed. 
Media interest was stirred by the impending thirtieth anniversary of 
Algerian independence in 1992, but extraneous events in former colonial 
dependencies were perhaps more significant. New Caledonia’s 1980s 
évènements compelled recollection of the Algerian War. So, too, did 
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Algeria’s tragic descent into bloody civil war after the annulment of the 
Front Islamique du Salut (fis) electoral triumph in 1991.101 The trial 
of Maurice Papon and media reexamination of torture cases in Algeria 
added momentum to the study of colonial memories and representations 
of empire in France.102 It is this increasing memorialization, itself deeply 
politicized, that leads Aldrich to pose the critical question: who is the 
proper “guardian,” if any, of colonial memory?
It bears emphasis, of course, that the sum total of the essays in both 
volumes might be dismissed as nothing more than the ruminations of 
the scholastic postcolonial mind, as the thoughts and ideas of rarefied 
academics — predominantly white, predominantly “Anglo-Saxon” (to 
use the French phrase) — attuned to the specialist debates that hold sway 
in the early twenty-first century and writing in an international climate 
in which accusations of a revival of Western colonialism, albeit in new 
guises, are commonplace. This may be true. But the fact that perspectives 
on empire and colonialism change over time is surely to be applauded. 
If these essays contribute to that process, they have done their job.
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